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In this paper, we rebut the case that Ashcroft, Christie and 
Swales [ACS] (2006) make in favour of the status quo 
fiscal settlement in Scotland that stems from the Scotland 
Act 1998.  This Act in creating the Scottish Parliament and 
Executive effectively separated public spending by the 
Scottish government from the need to raise taxes to 
finance it; rather, financing comes from Westminster 
through the Barnett formula.  We do not think that these 
arrangements provide a stable political solution in the UK, 
as is evidenced by the so-called West Lothian question - a 
matter that may be becoming of greater concern in 
England than hitherto. Scotland, therefore, should be 
forewarned that even if it does not move from the status 
quo, movement might anyway be forced on it. 
 
That ACS (2006) speak quite highly of our ideas on fiscal 
federalism in Scotland (Hallwood and MacDonald (2005) 
and MacDonald and Hallwood (2004)), suggests to us that 
they too accept that the present fiscal arrangements are 
not necessarily at a stable equilibrium. We find it strange, 
therefore, that they so vigorously defend the present 
system, especially the Barnett formula component of it. 
Their case for Barnett is that it offers a hard budget 
constraint that effectively disciplines the Scottish public 
sector. We will show that this belief in Barnett is based on a 
serious misconception of its economic consequences. 
Despite the fact that Barnett sets an upper limit on public 
spending by the Scottish Executive it is by no means a 
hard budget constraint.  Indeed, so poor is its fiscal 
discipline on the Executive that it is better described as a 
formula for a "Rakes Progress". 
 
The Ashcroft, Christie and Swales case for Barnett 
Ashcroft, Christie and Swales (2006) provide a table in 
which they compare the characteristics of the Barnett 
formula system for financing devolved Scottish Executive 
spending with that of fiscal autonomy of the type that we 
proposed in MacDonald and Hallwood (2006). According to 
them, like fiscal autonomy, the Barnett formula offers a 
hard budget constraint and is efficient at handling the split 
of resources between the Scottish public and private 
sectors. They say "no attempt is made in this table to 
indicate the degree or extent to which each characteristic is 
present in each system". However, they do say that: 
"The present Barnett based system already exhibits many 
of the characteristics required to encourage the efficient 
use of resources and allow a democratically disciplined 
Scottish Parliament to make optimal allocation decisions." 
 
We take it that they mean 'optimal decisions' it in the same 
way as we do in our 2004, 2005 and 2006 papers. That is, 
that they think that the use of the Barnett formula promotes 
equalisation of net benefits within the present structure of 
public spending, between current Scottish public and 
private spending and also across time. 
 
ACS correctly imply that the focus of our criticisms of 
Barnett is that it acts as a soft budget constraint on Scottish 
public spending, resulting in non-optimal resource 
allocation. But they claim that: 
 
"There would appear to be little between the two systems 
[Barnett versus fiscal autonomy] in the hardness of the 
budget constraint". 
 
This claim is wildly inaccurate. To understand why, 
economic analysis needs to be applied to the matter. 
 
Why Barnett does not work as a mechanism for 
fiscal discipline 
Begin by writing G - T as Scotland's budget deficit with 
Westminster, where G is the Scottish Executive's spending 
and T is taxes collected in Scotland.
1 
Now consider how a 
Scottish budget deficit, if there is one, is financed. Write F 
as Barnett transfers to Scotland and X as taxes raised in 
Scotland but sent to Westminster and so the difference 
between F and X is the counterpart to a Scottish budget 
deficit. Thus, if F exceeds X Scotland is a net recipient of 
public funds from Westminster.
2
 
 
Thus, 
G - T = F - X (1) 
 
This implies that a Scottish budget deficit is financed by net 
financial transfers into Scotland from Westminster. 
 
It is in the nature of the present Scottish fiscal system that F 
is fixed through the Barnett formula.  It is also true, 
approximately at least, that the Executive spends the whole 
of the Barnett grant.  Thus, G = F = by an amount  set by 
the formula.  That G and F are fixed  is recognised in 
equation (2) by putting an asterisk after them: 
 
G* - T = F* - X (2) 
 
 
 
The implication of equation (2) for given G* and F* is that if 
taxes, T, collected in Scotland happen to fall, to balance 
the equation, taxes raised in Scotland and sent to 
Westminster, X, must fall too. Under present fiscal 
arrangements this will happen automatically as income 
taxes, VAT and some other taxes (but not council tax) 
collected in Scotland are indeed sent to Westminster.
3
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With this background it is easy to see why the Barnett 
formula is a soft budget constraint. Any fall in taxes 
collected in Scotland is offset by reduced tax transfers to 
Westminster. In other words, Scottish budget deficits (G - 
T) are self-financing. The Executive can maintain the level 
of government spending, G, regardless of what is 
happening to the level of taxes raised in Scotland. 
 
By concentrating only on F* - the Barnett transfer to 
Scotland - ACS misled themselves into thinking that this 
alone constitutes a hard budget constraint.  However, the 
hardness or otherwise of a budget constraint must also 
consider the responsibility that a government has for 
raising the money it spends. Barnett does not impose this 
responsibility; indeed, it allows the Scottish Executive and 
Parliament to be shot of it. 
 
The Executive does not have to be concerned with pithy 
fiscal matters such as matching taxes with spending.
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Nor does it have to be concerned for reasons of fiscal 
discipline with introducing fiscal polices to raises the 
Scottish tax base by promoting economic growth. 
 
Nor, if taxes raised in Scotland fall does the Executive have 
to worry about balancing its budget by cutting the level of 
public spending. 
 
Nor does it have to risk the wrath of voters by raising tax 
rates (rather than cutting its spending). 
 
Nor, even, does the Executive have to think about 
increasing its borrowing by issuing tradable securities 
against future tax revenues. 
 
Indeed, none of these tough decisions have to be made by 
the Scottish Executive and it is for this reason that they are 
most unlikely to worry about the balance of public and 
private spending in Scotland, or, intertemporal matters 
such as growing the Scottish economy.
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Indeed, with the Barnett formula, if the Executive wanted to 
worry about any of these things it would be a matter of 
choice and not of fiscal discipline as imposed by the 
present fiscal system. Of course, the Executive could 
decide to think about tough issues such as what policies it 
might adopt to raise the Scottish tax base; and if it wanted 
to it could think about whether the level of its spending is 
justified relative to the level of taxes raised in Scotland. 
But these are matters that governments with real hard 
budget constraints have to think about and have to take 
unpleasant measures to deal with, but not the Scottish 
Executive. It is free of such tough decision-making; like the 
woman who won the lottery, all it has to worry about is how 
to spend it! 
 
The closest analogy that we can think of to the present 
fiscal settlement is if a rich Laird gave his son a generous 
allowance. He links this allowance to an obscure formula 
that over time basically makes little or no difference to the 
size of the allowance. He also tells his son that he would 
like him to earn some money on his own account and to 
hand it over to him when he gets it. Furthermore, part of 
the deal is that however much each year the son hands 
back to the Laird the generous pocket money will always 
be paid. Anybody can see that this is a formula for a rake's 
progress. The boy will reason that with the allowance 
secure 'why bother working to improve myself?' On this 
point, an inspection of William Hogarth's depiction of the 
Rake's Progress is rewarding - in a series of eight pictures 
from stalwart young man to years later residence in 
bedlam; an 'economic bedlam' in our depiction of the 
present fiscal system. 
 
High oil prices 
What if Scottish tax revenues increased, due to a rise in oil 
prices?  Many in Scotland see this as a bedlam of a 
different kind because the increased tax revenues are 
presently passed directly to Westminster. It is the UK 
treasury that benefits while Scottish government spending 
remains constrained by Barnett. Nor can the extra oil 
revenues be used to cut Scottish taxes - in the unlikely 
event that Scottish Labour would ever think along those 
lines.  Scotland would benefit from lower taxes only to the 
extent that the UK government used increased tax 
revenues to cut taxes across the UK as a whole. 
 
Budget constraints under variants of fiscal 
devolution are more effective than under Barnett 
It is of course true, as we argued in Hallwood and 
MacDonald (2005) and MacDonald and Hallwood 
(2004,2006), that variants of fiscal devolution offer harder 
budget constraints than the Barnett formula. Here we 
consider two variants: fiscal federalism and fiscal 
autonomy. 
 
Fiscal federalism 
For the fiscal federalist position, write: 
G - T = ΔD + F*FF - XFF (3) 
where F*FF - transfers from Westminster to Scotland under 
some formula to be worked out - is fixed but, presumably, 
lower than F* as XFF (tax transfers from Scotland to 
England with fiscal federalism) is lower than X given that 
with fiscal federalism Scotland would be retaining some of 
the taxes raised in the country instead of sending them all 
to Westminster. For example, with fiscal federalism 
Scotland might retain 40 per cent of the income taxes it 
raises, sending the other 60 per cent to Westminster. 
 
With fiscal federalism, if taxes raised in Scotland fall, the 
right hand side of equation (3) must increase also, but not 
by an equal automatic reduction in taxes sent to England 
as is the case with the Barnett formula because only 60 per 
cent of income taxes are sent to Westminster. To finance a 
larger Scottish budget deficit, the Executive would have to 
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issue debt - so ΔD increases. As the financial markets 
effectively set limits on ΔD, the Executive must now be 
concerned for the levels of both G and T - it faces hard 
decisions over its tax policies and level of government 
spending. 
 
Fiscal autonomy 
The budget constraint with fiscal autonomy is tougher still 
and is written as: 
 
G – T = ΔD (4) 
 
The terms F*FF - XFF drop out as fiscal transfers from and to 
Westminster would cease under fiscal autonomy.
6    
All 
fiscal cushioning would be removed and the Executive 
would be on its own managing its fiscal affairs. While ACS 
(2006) lament this state of affairs it is in fact the actual 
situation faced by many countries the same size as 
Scotland and smaller. The potential time inconsistency of 
the budget constraint under a fiscal federal settlement, is 
one of the key reasons why we now prefer a fiscally 
devolved settlement for Scotland based on fiscal 
autonomy. 
 
Equity issues 
ACS (2006) say that in making our case for fiscal autonomy 
we marginalize equity-in-the-Union considerations.  
Although we would not necessarily put it this way, to some 
extent we have. But there is another way to look at their 
concern. As Scottish-sourced taxes vary over time, 
especially with oil prices, the Scottish budget deficit, G - T, 
probably varies from negative to positive and back again. 
In effect, either England is sending 'aid' to Scotland or 
Scotland is sending 'aid' to England.  The SNP has recently 
argued on the basis of the attribution of all oil revenues to 
Scotland, that Scotland subsidises the rest of the UK to the 
tune of £853 per capita.   However, unionist parties, such 
as the Conservative and Labour parties and recent 
comments in the English press, have argued that Scotland 
obtains generous transfers from the rest of the UK, allowing 
per capita public spending in Scotland to be higher than in 
England, and far higher in comparison with some English 
regions.  If one accepts the latter argument, 
it would clearly be a mistake to think that the Barnett 
formula is not at risk. In other words, the so-called 'equity' 
that ACS treasure so highly might well be disappearing 
anyway. And the same goes for the First Minister, Jack 
McConnell, who is quoted as saying that fiscal autonomy 
would only mean lower government spending or higher 
taxes - but absent access to high oil revenues he might 
well be facing that scenario anyway. 
 
Incentive effects 
ACS essentially avoid the important issue of the 
incentivising effects of tax changes on private sector 
behaviour, stressing the potential costs of moving to a 
more devolved fiscal system. For example, they indicate 
that 'the Scottish Parliament can increase or decrease its 
budget through increasing or decreasing the standard rate 
of income tax.' However, the rate of variation allowed is 
small and we believe would do little to produce incentives 
for the existing labour force nor be sufficient to reverse the 
persistent outflow of talented labour from Scotland 
evidenced over the years. And it is only income tax the 
Scottish Parliament can currently change. Changes in 
corporation taxes and other taxes, such as VAT, seem to 
have had powerful incentive effects in other countries, but 
the Scottish parliament currently has no power over them. 
 
Cuts in corporation tax are often seen as part of 'a race to 
the bottom' and they indeed could be used in that way if 
they were used to invest in the production of goods and 
services which could be produced more competitively 
elsewhere (i.e with lower wage costs). However, rather 
than using tax changes to engage in such a race, they 
could be used in sophisticated ways to reinforce and 
bolster Scotland's existing strengths. For example, 
Scotland has world renowned judicial and educational 
systems and an important financial sector built on the 
existence of a well-qualified work force and well-defined 
property rights. Why shouldn't Scotland aspire to be the 
leading financial sector in the world (with the sector based 
in the Glasgow - Edinburgh hub)? Other countries - 
Switzerland and Luxembourg, for example, have so 
aspired and have made dramatic inroads in this regard (for 
example, the authorities in Luxembourg have skilfully 
manipulated their VAT system vis-a-vis the rest of Europe 
to build an important financial services sector and a very 
prosperous economy). 
 
ACS emphasise the down side, or costs, of the ability to 
have freedom over tax raising powers. One is the potential 
spillover effects - in terms of labour and capital movements 
– of having tax rates which are quite different to our near 
neighbour.  For two roughly equally sized economies, such 
spillovers are likely to be of considerable concern, but for a 
small open economy, such as Scotland, vis-a-vis its much 
larger neighbour, the negative spillovers for the neighbour 
are likely to be small while the positive advantages for 
Scotland are likely to be highly significant. Indeed, and as 
we alluded to above, it can be argued that the current 
system has had detrimental spillover effects for Scotland in 
terms of north-south labour movements. Again, 
Luxembourg seems to be a good example of a small open 
economy that has created negative spillovers for its much 
larger near neighbours, but not incurred their wrath. 
 
ACS are correct to note that a move to more fiscal 
devolution for Scotland would mean moving away from the 
insurance function offered by the current system to one 
which is much more uncertain, relying on the vagaries of 
the price of oil. However, and as we noted in our previous 
paper, there are methods of smoothing oil revenues and 
the Norwegian model seems to offer an excellent example 
of this. 
 
So we would counter the claim of ACS that a move to a 
system in Scotland which is much more reliant on the 
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devolution of taxes is one in which efficiency 
considerations are privileged whilst equity and stabilisation 
issues are marginalised. There is no reason why equity 
issues need be abandoned with fiscal autonomy, although 
the way they are achieved under the new system would 
clearly be different to that in the current system. Indeed, it 
would seem to us that in their support for the Barnet 
formula, ACS privilege the equity aspect of a fiscal 
settlement at the expense of the efficiency aspect. As we 
stressed in our previous paper, stabilisation issues can be 
addressed in a fiscally devolved system and there are 
examples of this from the experiences of other countries, 
which have a greater degree of fiscal devolution than the 
UK. 
 
Empirical matters 
ACS cast doubt on the empirical evidence that tax 
independence can promote economic growth. They argue 
that 'Hallwood and MacDonald now assert that the 
empirical evidence indicates that increased fiscal 
decentralisation is favourable to economic growth. They did 
not adopt such a straightforward view in their previous 
work'. However, much of the empirical evidence that we 
refer to in MacDonald and Hallwood (2006) simply was not 
available to us at the time of writing Hallwood and 
MacDonald (2005) and MacDonald and Hallwood (2004) 
and we simply reiterate that our reading of this more recent 
empirical evidence is that it does indeed indicate that 
increased fiscal devolution is growth promoting. For 
example, papers by Lin and Liu (2000), Akai and Sakata 
(2002), Stansel (2005) and Iimi (2005) find a clear and 
statistically significant positive relationship between fiscal 
devolution and economic growth. For instance, Stansel 
(2005), uses a new data set comprising 314 US 
metropolitan areas to show that there is a positive and 
highly significant relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth: a one standard 
deviation increase in decentralization produces a 2.5 per 
cent increase in per capita income growth. 
 
 
As we argued in MacDonald and Hallwood (2006), another 
way of approaching the fiscal devolution - growth link is to 
assess if a lower tax burden and smaller public sector 
would stimulate economic growth in Scotland, an issue 
which we have seen is of great importance from a 
theoretical perspective.  Recently published work by Lee 
and Gordon (2005) using cross-section data for 70 
countries over the period 1970 to 1997 suggests that lower 
rates of corporation tax contribute to faster rates of 
economic growth. In particular, after controlling for other 
growth inducing factors, lowering corporate tax rates by 
ten-per cent can increase the growth rate of real GDP by 
between one and two per cent per year. Lee and Gordon 
(2005) also address the well-known lack of systematic 
relationship between tax burdens and rates of economic 
growth. They suggest that high rates of economic growth 
can lead to higher tax burdens due to the need to build 
infrastructure, and that this can confound a null hypothesis 
of an inverse relationship between tax burdens and 
economic growth rates. 
 
Conclusions 
We think that by defending the Barnett formula so strongly, 
with essentially no criticisms of it at all, that ACS (2006) are 
simply making a case for the status quo.  They are quite 
clear as to why they do so: 
 
"If anything Hallwood and MacDonald's proposals are likely 
to increase the pressure on Scottish MPs at Westminster". 
 
Indeed, we too think that this would be the case. The West 
Lothian question would become even more poignant than it 
is now. However, one has to wonder whether the status 
quo fiscal-cum-Barnett settlement is a stable political 
equilibrium for the UK? It is implicit in our earlier papers 
that we think that it is not. The tone of ACS is that they too 
rather support fiscal federalism though not fiscal autonomy, 
so perhaps they too have some doubts as to the 
permanence of the current Scottish fiscal situation.7  So 
why defend it? 
 
The Scotland Act of 1998 created the absurdity of 
separating public spending from taxation. One has to 
wonder for how many more years are Scotland and the rest 
of the UK to labour under this failing fiscal mechanism.  We 
think that some institutional response will inevitably be 
applied to address this important asymmetry, and we have 
offered two such - fiscal federalism and fiscal autonomy. 
Other fiscal mechanisms no doubt could be invented, but 
whether they, whatever they are, can handle the West 
Lothian question with less strain on the UK as a unitary 
state, remains to be seen. While ACS (2006) are doubtless 
well meaning in their defence of the status quo  - a rear 
guard action to 'save' the Union, not as it existed from the 
Act of Union to 1998, but as the Labour Party with its huge 
Parliamentary majorities created it, they will likely be 
disappointed. 
 
Nobody, of course, can foresee the future, but if we were to 
take a long view of how the 'fiscal anomaly' is to be 
addressed where would we place our bets? With the 
Scottish Liberal-Democrats and their Steel Commission 
supporting fiscal federalism, the new leader of the 
Conservative Party saying that Scotland can have fiscal 
autonomy if it wants it, as well as the Scottish Nationalists 
being in favour of any tax devolution, it has to be 
recognised that the idea has political legs.  Presumably if 
this rising tide in favour of tax devolution is not turned back, 
the West Lothian question will come even more to the fore. 
Judging by what is being said in the English press and the 
Conservative Party Westminster may move to restrict the 
voting rights of Scottish MPs, just as English MPs are 
restricted on voting on so many Scottish spending matters. 
Thus, one really does have to wonder whether the 
Constitutional settlement of 1998 is a political equilibrium 
for the UK. If it is not, if the ultimate equilibrium is not to be 
Scottish independence, then perhaps reversion to two 
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sovereign parliaments under one crown will be it. However, 
given that there may well be important institutional 
constraints on the devolution of all, or a substantial 
proportion of, taxes within a unitary state (see, for example, 
Case C-88/03 of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities), it may be that it is only full blown 
independence which can guarantee that the full panoply of 
tax levers are devolved to the Scottish Parliament. 
 
In sum, we argue that the current fiscal settlement for 
Scotland is no longer politically tenable, nor is it defensible in 
terms of the economics of designing an appropriate fiscal 
settlement for Scotland. In terms of the latter, the current 
Barnett settlement offers essentially no route for the public 
and private sectors to be incentivised in terms of tax 
changes and it has at its core a soft budget constraint. The 
latter means that the public/private sector balance in 
Scotland is unlikely to be optimal. We therefore propose that 
some form of fiscal devolution must be introduced, and 
introduced soon, to address these issues and to enable the 
Scottish parliament to discharge its democratic function.  We 
argue here, and in our previous work, that some of the 
advantages of fiscal devolution are available in a fiscal 
federal system. However, we believe that incentives for both 
politicians and the private sector are at their clearest under 
fiscal autonomy, a system of fiscal devolution which focuses 
on the devolution of a substantial proportion – perhaps all - 
of the tax base (rather than the assignment of a substantial 
proportion of taxes) and has at its heart a hard budget 
constraint. In closing, we note one of the exquisite ironies of 
the Labour party’s position on increased fiscal devolution for 
Scotland. In considering the case for entry into the Euro 
area, Labour (UK) argued strongly that a key criterion for the 
UK joining the euro area was that there had to be sufficient 
flexibility in the operation of fiscal policy (in order to be able 
to counter the effects of a one- size-fits all monetary policy), 
and we support that argument here. However, both Labour 
(UK) and Labour (Scotland) seem determined to prevent 
Scotland from having the same flexibility in the use of its 
fiscal policy, despite the fact that it is also part of a one-size-
fits all monetary union. 
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Endnotes 
1 
If G - T < 0 there is a Scottish budget surplus with Westminster, 
of which more later. 
2 
We are aware that there are provisions for emergency borrowing 
by the Executive from Westminster, but as ACS leave this out of 
their account so will we. 
3 
The same reasoning applies even if Scotland is running a budget 
surplus with Westminster, G - T < 0. The equality (2) must 
continue to hold. A fall in Scottish tax collections also causes a fall 
in the amount of taxes sent to Westminster. 
4 
Usually this is stated in terms of matching "over the course of a 
business cycle". 
5 
It is true that though, as we have argued in our other papers, that 
in principle the Scottish Executive and Parliament should be able 
to get the balance between different types of public spending right. 
6 
We have not split ΔD into issue of marketable debt and issue of 
money. 
7 
Indeed, in our Fraser of Allander paper we thank Brian Ashcroft 
for helpful comments, and we don't recall him ever making a case 
against fiscal federalism.
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